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Shadworth Hollway Hodgson may have been the first philosopher to develop an account 
of the temporal structure of experience and to explicitly relate the temporal characteristics 
of consciousness to the body and brain. His account of temporal experience is historically 
significant in its own right. His development of what is essentially a form of 
phenomenological analysis both predates and influenced that of Husserl (Andersen and 
Grush 2009). Hodgson’s views were deeply influential on William James, who widely 
cites him in The Principles of Psychology. His work is also philosophically significant in 
that he offers something genuinely new with respect to contemporary philosophical 
discussions of time consciousness and its relationship to the brain. His work is rich 
territory to mine for insights to be applied to contemporary issues related to experience, 
temporality, and especially neurophenomenology. 
 Hodgson’s trailblazing work involves analysis of the present moment in 
experience as the keystone element in a much larger project concerning experience, 
consciousness, knowledge, and action. While Hodgson’s views on the character of the 
present moment in experience are distinctive, they are only the first part of a massive 
project in philosophical thought. His four volume lifework, Metaphysic of Experience, 
lays out a sophisticated and complete system for philosophy, in terms of its proposed 
scope of inquiry, its method for analysis, its orientation towards its subject matter, and 
the substantive views of experience and knowledge that emerge from this method. It is 
intended to unify and complete projects started by Kant and the British Empiricists but 
which remained, according to Hodgson, unfinished. Space restrictions prevent a full 
exploration of Hodgson’s idiosyncratic notions of experience, knowledge, and 
consciousness. My focus will be on laying out the key features of Hodgson’s account of 
the experience of the present moment that stands as a potential alternative to that of 
Husserl’s well-known account. My synopsis is intended to pull out philosophically useful 
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material that can be applied to contemporary discussions, in particular to 
neurophenomenology. 
 I’ll begin with a brief overview of the motivation for Hodgson’s work, in terms of 
its relationship to early modern rationalism, empiricism, and idealism, since that 
motivates much of his proto-phenomenological method. Then, I’ll discuss a series of key 
ideas that are distinctive to Hodgson’s account of temporal experience, and compare 
some of these features t Husserl's account.  
 
II. Motivating his methodology 
Hodgson wants to answer the question of how we have knowledge of the world and how 
such knowledge is related to experience. While this is a common enough theme, his take 
on it is unique: experience is what is present, and the totality of what is, is experience, in 
a metaphysically fundamental way. His emphasis on the present moment as central to 
empiricism is novel in this historical discussion. The unification of rationalist, empiricist, 
and idealist thought that he purports to offer turns completely on the temporal character 
of experience. 
 He opens his discussion of experience with a long discussion of philosophical 
methodology. How ought we to proceed in using philosophical inquiry to get genuine 
knowledge? He identifies each of empiricism, rationalism, and idealism as having gotten 
something right in its philosophical methodology, while also going astray in various 
regards. 
 Empiricism is right to emphasize that experience must be the ultimate source of 
knowledge. Thinkers like Hume, however, took common sense experience as providing 
the materials from which knowledge could be drawn. But, according to Hodgson, this 
presupposed certain common sense assumptions, such as the positing of an objective 
existence outside of consciousness. Instead, we have to establish such a claim, not 
assume it a priori, and in order to establish it we must take a subjective orientation, as 
Hodgson calls it, as the basis for philosophical investigation, not an objective one like 
common sense offers. Rationalism, such as that offered in Descartes’ Meditations, has the 
correct subjective orientation. But thinkers like Descartes found errors in the common 
sense understanding of the world and spuriously assumed that experience must always 
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err. Idealists have come closer but still failed to understand the full extent of the 
relationship between knowledge and experience by introducing noumena. 
 The result Hodgson reaches is a view of philosophy as reasoning based on 
experience that is an early version of phenomenology of consciousness, and in particular, 
of the present moment in experience as all that is genuinely available for analysis. The 
proper approach to philosophical analysis focuses on what Hodgson calls the empirical 
present moment. 
…whatever we are actually experiencing is always the content of a present 
moment of experience, which may be called the empirical present, in order to 
distinguish it from an abstract mathematical moment of time, which, like a 
mathematical point of space, has in itself no content at all. We have no actual 
experience which is not included in the content of the empirical present 
moment… The term actual expresses the reality of the present content, when and 
while it is present in consciousness. (ME, p. 35) 
 
What is actually real must be actually in experience, and everything that has ever been 
real has been so because it was a present moment in experience. The core of the real just 
is the contents of current consciousness, and whatever else can be shown to exist based 
on those current and changing contents of consciousness.  
 After detailed preparations for the analysis, the actual empirical moment Hodgson 
considers is given in a single sentence. “Let me suppose, then, that I am seated writing in 
my study, and that some one in the room strikes the note C on a pianoforte behind me. 
The sound enters the field of consciousness, and takes its place there as part of the 
content of my immediate experience” (ME, p. 46). While Hodgson eventually adds to his 
scenario – another note, D, follows after C – he relies on little experiential material in 
order to perform the analysis. He brackets all questions of history and genesis, as he puts 
it, in order to consider the contents of experience free of questions about what brought 
about or sustains those parts of experience.  
 Hodgson claims that analysis of this single moment enables it to highlight 
universal and genuinely “metaphysic” features of that experience. He draws a parallel 
with geometry: “First, however, I must remark that the instance now examined, and every 
part of it, which may be examined separately, may be considered as a representative case, 
standing for all empirical present moments of experience, or for their parts; just as a 
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triangle drawn on paper stands as a representative for all possible triangles…” (ME, pp. 
43-44). His method should be verifiable by the readers’ putting themselves into the same 
scenario. “It is an analysis, not an argument; and its proof lies in accuracy of observation, 
not in cogency of inference” (ME, p. 46).  
 Hodgson’s analysis is intended to have the double feature of illustrating how the 
method of analysis is supposed to proceed, while also beginning the task of coming up 
with the actual results of such an analysis. His analysis asks, of what do we actually gain 
knowledge through experience once we succeed in avoiding undue assumptions? The 
effect of the analysis is less like building an edifice, adding one utterly sure foundational 
block at a time, than it is like starting with a massive block of common-sense experience 
and cutting away portions of it, the unjustified assumptions, to reveal the genuine content 
and structure of experience in the present. 
 
III. Key features of a Hodgsonian account of temporal experience 
This section lays out key elements of Hodgson’s view, drawing both from the method for 
performing the analysis and the results of that analysis. It is helpful to see how all these 
features contribute to the overall coherence of his account before each element is 
elaborated in the following two sections. Hodgson is refining a view of the empiric 
present moment that he originally introduced in Time and Space (1868), which was the 
first time the experienced present was clearly defined as extending over some relevant 
duration. 
 
1) Experience only is the present, and the present is experience. Experience and the 
present moment of experience are metaphysically coeval, and can be used 
interchangeably. Temporal experience of the present is not a special species of 
experience; all experience is fundamentally temporal and always is the present. 
 
2) The ultimate structure of experience is process-contents. The processual aspects of 
time cannot be fundamentally separated from their contents. There is no content-free 




3) There is a threshold in experience, above which process-contents abruptly appear and 
then away from which they flow. The genesis and sustaining conditions of our experience 
should be bracketed at first, but are already contained in the succession of process-
contents in experience by dint of this threshold. By standing at the edge of the threshold, 
watching the ever-new process-contents rise above it, the analysis moves past the 
bracketing by revealing in conscious experience that which is outside of and gives rise to 
conscious experience. 
 
4) The way process-contents fade from immediacy into the past is called retention. There 
are no fixed boundaries to retention as process-contents trail off to memory proper. 
Process-contents may enter experience together but leave the present differentially. 
 
5) The fontal character of experience involves process-contents continually rising above 
the threshold, retaining their ordering as they flow away from that threshold. It is how 
experience can serve as the basis for all knowledge. 
 
6) All experience is reflective in character. No matter how thinly one slices experience in 
analyzing it, the result is always reflective of other parts of experience. Process-contents 
are in experience as soon as they cross the threshold, but must be slightly past the 
threshold to be part of reflective experience. This means that experience that is fully 
reflectively available is always just past the leading edge of the threshold. 
 
7) The present moves in two distinguishable ways, depending on the perspective from 
which it is considered. One perspective considers the threshold and the present just after 
the threshold, such that process-contents move through the present and into the past. The 
other perspective follows a given process-content as it rises above the threshold, is 
reflectively full in experience, and fades into retention, where the present moment moves 
forward from that process-content into the future. 
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8) There are two temporal arrows, with opposing directionalities. One is the order of real 
conditions in the world, including brain conditions, that points from past to future. The 
other is the order of knowledge, which points from the present as most surely known, 
towards the past, as content is progressively less surely known. These two arrows yield 
the same ordering of events but in reverse. They are united at the threshold in experience. 
 
 
IV. The empirical present in experience 
This section will explain points 1 through 4 from the previous section. These points 
jointly elaborate what Hodgson calls the empirical present moment. 
 
(1) The central tenet of his new empiricism is point 1, that experience and the present 
moment are the same. 
Not only, therefore, is an empirical present moment the only thing which it is 
possible to analyse as it actually occurs, but it is the only thing which ever exists 
as an immediate experience of ours. When we say that experience consists of a 
succession of empirical present moments, we are expressing an inference drawn 
from the content of the empirical moment actually present at the time of 
speaking… Indeed it is only from the analysis of an empirical present, that the 
meaning of the term present, as distinguished from past or future, can itself be 
ascertained. (ME, pp. 35-36) 
  
There is a tendency in contemporary discussions to treat temporal experience as a 
particular subspecies of experience, individuated by its object of awareness. There is 
visual experience, for instance, and experience of the present moment, which could be 
compared as each a subspecies of some more generic notion of experience. On the 
Hodgsonian view given here, though, experience just is temporal experience, or put 
another way, just is the present moment. There is no non-temporal experience, either as 
atemporal content or as contentless structure into which temporal content could be 
placed. 
 
(2) Experience is inextricably temporal, and, as we see in point 2, he places Time and 
Feeling, process and content respectively, as the fundamental units of experience. 
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The lowest conceivable empirical moment of experience contains both time and 
feeling, and the lowest empirical moment in experience as it actually comes to us 
contains both sequence in time and difference in feeling. ... We see, then, that time 
and feeling together are experience. They are elements of experience in 
inseparable relation with each other; and this is at once the simplest and most 
general of all the facts of experience, upon which the general conception of 
Relation is founded. (ME, pp. 64-65) 
 
He uses the term of art ‘process-contents’ to refer to experience and its contents in a way 
that indicates that we can distinguish in analysis between experience as temporally 
structured and experience as contentful, but also that these are two facets of one 
underlying unity, separable only in analysis.  
Experience in its simplest form, and in the simplest possible instance of it, is both 
process and content; and it should be expressly noted, that, according to the 
analysis here given, duration is common to both aspects of it, common to it both 
as a process and as content; the duration element in every content being that 
which adds its aspect as a process to its aspect as a content. (ME, 61-62) 
 
Process-contents as a term reminds the reader that there is no non-temporal content, and 
there is no content-free process of experience.  
 In several places he relies on an analogy between the process-contents of 
experience and the intertwined parts of a rope. “The common-sense experience or 
empirical present analyzed is, as it were, a transverse section or segment, taken out of 
what may be figured as a stream of consciousness consisting of many various currents, or 
a cable consisting of variously coloured strands, variously intertwined” (ME, p. 41). 
While process-contents can be distinguished by their content as they exist together in a 
given empirical moment, such content still figures in that moment holistically. This does 
not mean, he says, that the contents in consciousness lie next to one another separately, in 
the way that parts of a rope sit next to one another and each comprise some percentage of 
the total volume of the rope in any section. 
We have now to analyse this same experience as a process, or in other words, the 
fact that the experience takes place… Its experience is an event in time having 
duration. One and the same duration of time is an element in the content of the 
experience analysed, in the one way of taking it, and is the foundation of the other 
way of taking it, namely, as a process of experiencing… But, as it is, the process-
content analysed is experienced as a distinct but unsevered portion of a larger 
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process, which is partly simultaneous and partly antecedent. It is, as it were, the 
end-portion of a thread, in a rope consisting of many threads. (ME, p. 54). 
 
Hodgson uses this underlying unity of experience as process-contents as a kind of 
epistemic lever by which to close any gap between what genuinely exists in reality and 
that which can be the content of experience. He will ultimately pronounce the content of 
experience and what exists as same in extent, differing only in the aspect under which we 
consider them.  
 
(3) The notion of process-contents rejects the idea that there is a fixed structure of the 
present in experience, through which content then flows. This is often how Husserl’s 
tripartite account of time consciousness is understood (see Brough chapter in this volume, 
and section VI below). Hodgson argues that, just like there is no rope without the strands 
that are woven together, there is no bare present to be filled by separate content. 
Consequently we are compelled by the facts of perception to conceive, that the 
duration of every content of consciousness, simple or complex, passes away into 
memory along with its content, and is no fixed form or measure, filled by a 
fleeting content, which for a brief moment, the empirical present, is arrested and 
retained therein; or in other words, is no form or measure, existing separably 
from, or prior to, its content, feeling, and into which feelings must be brought in 
order to their being perceived. Duration and content are inseparable, arising 
together in consciousness, and together passing away into memory. (ME, pp. 133-
134) 
 
Hodgson started his analysis by bracketing the possible causes or conditions for 
experience, in order to analyze experience without assumptions about how it came to be. 
Quite early on in his analysis, however, he returns to those ideas that he earlier bracketed, 
such as the existence of an external world. Knowledge of the existence of a world 
external to experience cannot be assumed prior to analyzing experience, he emphasized, 
but very little analysis is required to show that such knowledge is already contained in 
experience. The process-contents arise freshly in an ongoing fountain, and they rise, he 
notes, above some threshold. The threshold just is that which marks the boundary of 
experience that is crossed by new process-contents. Consciousness, here taken to be 
equivalent to experience, includes within it the notion of that which is external to 
consciousness. Thus Hodgson recognizes the existence of the world that is external to 
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consciousness, but not as a posit or assumption. It is uncovered as already contained in 
and justified with surety by the very notion of consciousness. 
The supposition of a reality which is not consciousness is thus introduced by the 
figurative expression, a threshold of consciousness, which is an image drawn 
from space, involving the ideas, (1) of a boundary between consciousness and 
non-consciousness, and, (2) that the appearance of consciousness above the 
boundary line is in some way due to something real in the region of non-
consciousness below the boundary… A state or process which is both 
consciousness and non-consciousness, as a supposed state of consciousness below 
the threshold must be, is impossible. The term consciousness in its widest sense 
implicitly contains above the threshold as part of its own meaning. (ME, pp. 55-
56) 
 
The existence of a threshold in the present moment, such that the crossing of this 
threshold just is a process-content coming into the empirical present moment, is sufficient 
to take us back out of the bracketing. It establishes the first clear and assumption-free 
evidence in experience for something external to experience, namely, what will 
eventually be shown to be the external world.  
In consequence of real conditions that lie below the threshold of consciousness … 
states of consciousness appear above the threshold, and from the instant of arising 
recede into the past, since their contents have duration, and the ever-arising new 
content is that portion of the whole which is nearest in time to the ever advancing 
present instant, which is the instant of origin of every successively arising 
empirical portion or content. (ME, p. 66) 
 
‘Real conditioning’, another term of art, refers to the processes on which experience 
depends. He insists that real conditioning is not what had, at that point, traditionally gone 
under the name of causality. Nor is his view that consciousness supervenes on physical 
processes: the relationship between consciousness and real conditions is not the same as 
supervenience, even though it is suggestively similar. He also hasn’t yet reached the 
place in the analysis where we could call the real conditions that are external to 
consciousness “physical” without making an illegitimate assumption. But he is 
progressively showing how broad metaphysical conclusions can be derived from this 
simplest of empirical present moments under analysis. Hodgson spends a substantial 
portion of volume 2 of ME on real conditioning as key to understanding the relationship 
between natural science and philosophy. 
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(4) The term ‘retention’ is introduced to characterize the portion of the empirical present 
moment that leads to the past. The threshold forms the leading edge towards the future, 
but what is the character of the trailing edge? Hodgson says that there is no determinate 
boundary for the empirical present moment, such that new content pushes the old out 
beyond the threshold of the past, nor do the contents of consciousness fade in synchrony 
through retention into what he calls memory proper. This is not merely the weak claim 
that, when comparing distinct empirical present moments, they have different durations. 
Hodgson is making the stronger claim that even for a given empirical present moment, 
there is no definitive boundary to where it ends. The present itself is comprised of 
different contents in an intriguing way, such that two contents in consciousness at the 
same time might each leave retention and become part of memory proper at two different 
instants. A knock at the door and a C note played on a piano might both occur 
simultaneously, yet leave consciousness differently, such that a single empirical present 
moment might be identified where the knock is already in memory while the tone lingers 
in retention. 
Any content during that time of its remaining in consciousness belongs to what I 
have called an empirical present moment. Some content the empirical present 
moment must always have, since otherwise it would not be a moment of 
experience at all. But inasmuch as different contents have different durations, and 
many different contents may be simultaneously present in consciousness, at least 
for some part of their durations, it follows that consciousness or experience does 
not occur in portions of uniform or fixed duration… The concrete content of 
consciousness consists of many different strains or features, not all beginning or 
ceasing together; so that, while we must always speak generally of the whole 
content, whatever it may be, as composing an empirical present moment, it is 
impossible to lay down any fixed duration applicable to the whole, as that in 
which its limit consists. (ME, pp. 36-37). 
 
Retention is the way in which process-contents that are just past linger in the empirical 
present moment somewhat before fully leaving the empirical present. "Now retention, or 
memory in its lowest terms, is a character which certainly cannot be said to be 
discriminated, or perceived as such, in the experience, though it is actually involved in 
perceived element of duration." (ME, p.59) 
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 Retention is distinguished from memory proper because the process-contents in 
retention are still part of the present, and are part of it with a just-past character. This 
gives us a sense of how the empirical present moment is structured, even while 
recognizing that it can be identified as a separate structure only in analysis. The leading 
or forward edge is sharp; it is the threshold across which new process-contents 
continually flow. Newer process-contents displace those just prior to them, while 
retaining the order in which they crossed the threshold as they move through the 
empirical present. The trailing edge is ragged and changing, because process-contents 
that crossed the threshold together may yet leave retention at different instants. 
 
 
V. Two motions of the present, two directions of time 
Point 5, the fontal character of knowledge and the way in which process-contents 
maintain their ordering as they pass through and out of consciousness, is crucial for any 
knowledge based on experience. There must be genuine content arising above the 
threshold to provide substantive knowledge, but in addition, it must remain in the order in 
which it first crossed the threshold for those contents to undergird knowledge. Without 
both of these two features, knowledge would be impossible. The first was well-discussed 
before Hodgson but the role of the second had not yet been appreciated. 
 Consider the very first appearance of content above the threshold. A given new 
process-content appears above the threshold, which means it enters the front edge of the 
empirical present moment. It comes from not-consciousness, which is just part of saying 
that is carries no mark of having been formed by, influenced by, constructed by, or 
otherwise merely dependent on pure consciousness itself. Hodgson calls this the fontal 
character of experience. It is helpful to think of the threshold like a line above which 
bubbles a spring or fountain of process-contents. The source is hidden from view, but 
there is clearly something that wells above the threshold itself. One can imagine Hodgson 
and Hume together considering this very threshold as new content emerges so ongoingly 
and yet so substantively, both marveling that new contents just keeps coming, even 
though the future out of which it comes is utterly opaque, and that it somehow does 
constitute into meaningful experience once it has crossed that threshold into experience. 
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Hume might focus more on the way in which we cannot, from this present, say anything 
utterly sure about what will appear in the future; but Hodgson is focused on the present 
contents and how they do just keep appearing. 
 This threshold provides the ordering of process-contents by lining them up, as it 
were, as they go over. This ordering in turns gives us the coherence of events at longer 
time scales than can fit into an empirical present moment.  
A present instant of consciousness defined merely by its place in time is always 
present; a present instant of consciousness defined as the beginning of a particular 
content of consciousness recedes along with that particular content into the past. 
Accordingly, as each new content arises and recedes into the past, it retains, or 
tends to retain, in the fading vista, the same place in the sequence, in which it 
originally arose. (ME, pp. 66-67) 
 
(6) Experience that is fully across the threshold becomes reflective. Hodgson relies on a 
conception of reflection to flesh out the character of the central part of the empirical 
present moment, that which is after the leading edge of the threshold and before the 
trailing edge of retention. Process-contents cannot be apprehended in the very instant at 
which they appear, but instead must be separated from the threshold above which they 
rise by at least some small margin in order for the content to be fully in experience. There 
must be space in which to reflect on the content, according to Hodgson, and that space 
means that there is some new as-yet-unreflected content between it and the very edge of 
the threshold. The empirical present moment is comprised of immediate reflection, in the 
sense of looking back upon, the just-past contents that have now already crossed the 
threshold but have not yet faded into the past. Reflection thus metaphorically positions 
the subject performing the analysis at the threshold itself, looking towards retention, able 
to ‘see’ process-contents after they have risen fully above the threshold. 
 
(7) This vantage point from which the empirical present is considered highlights two 
distinguishable directions in which the present can be said to be moving. One is the 
movement of a process-content through consciousness, if we track it from the instant it 
appears above the threshold till the last of its contents have faded from retention. The 
other is the movement of the present that goes forward as the crest of wave of the 
ongoing fountain of new process-contents.  
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… Even in the simplest case of perception, a single sound for instance, the 
moment of its appearing above the threshold of consciousness is also the moment 
of its beginning to recede into the past, so as to take its place in the panorama of 
empirical experience. One and the same process-content begins and continues for 
a time in consciousness, seeming, to us who think about it, to bear the present 
moment along with it as it advances, and so constituting what may be most 
properly called the empirical present; while at the same time since it is 
consciousness, and consciousness involves memory in the sense of retention, the 
mathematically present instance, at which we imagine ourselves, or any 
percipient, to be placed, when perceiving an empirical present, is always an 
instant of retrospection upon the consciousness process of that which that 
empirical present consists. We thus have an apparent movement in two opposite 
directions at once, involved in one and the same process of consciousness, and 
that in all cases. (ME, pp. 84-85) 
 
(8) Each of these directions of motions is associated with an arrow of time, or an ordering 
of process-contents. One ordering is given by real conditions in the objective world, an 
ordering of contents in terms of chains of causally linked events in a world that is 
external to experience. That direction moves into the future from the present. The second 
ordering is given by the order in which process-contents cross the threshold and retreat 
into the past. The arrow points from present towards the past, an ordering of process-
contents in terms of their distance from the vantage of the threshold. Closer process-
contents are more sure than those in the far past. The order of real conditions is from past 
to the present as pushing into the future, with the tip of the arrow at the threshold. The 
order of knowledge is from the present to the past, with the tail of the arrow at the 
threshold. 
To a Subject, therefore, standing at that rudimentary stage, both the receding order 
of the process-contents (in which it is seen at any present moment, and seen in 
retrospect), and the advancing order (in which it seems to bear the present 
moment along with it), are as yet one and the same; the former being what he will 
afterward call the order of knowledge (cognoscendi), and the latter the order of 
existence of real genesis and history (existendi)…This union of differences 
(implicit to him but explicit to us) which are really present in one and the same 
process, though recognized only at a later stage, is only possible because the 
process is one of consciousness; which, being both a knowing and an existent, has 
the psychological moment of its real genesis (or appearance above the threshold) 
coincident with the moment of reflective perception, in which it is a part of 
knowing. (ME, pp. 85-86) 
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The instant of crossing the threshold is, in the order of real conditioning, or, of events in 
the external world including the cerebral activity sustaining consciousness, the forward 
edge that pushes from the past into the future as chains of events unfurl. That very same 
threshold is the moment of present in experience, where Hodgson imagines the percipient 
to be viewing the ordering of process-contents facing towards the past, such that the most 
new contents are the first, or closest, in order of knowledge. Considering the order of real 
events, the present moment is moving along from the past towards the future. 
Considering the order of process-contents in experience, the present moment is unfurling 
from the present towards the past. The directions meet at the present. 
…consciousness as an existent, or what is the same thing, as the consciousness of 
a real Subject or Percipient, is always moving forwards, with the rest of the real 
existents, in the order of real genesis and history, and always consists, as a 
knowing, in reflection upon itself, that is, upon its own past contents, from every 
successive present moment actually reached in that forward movement, this 
reflective perception constituting what we call the order of knowledge. (ME, p. 
91) 
 
This offers an exciting unification of the Subject as an experiencing knower with the 
Subject as a real part of the existing world, along with all the non-knowing parts of that 
world. The empirical present gets pushed along a timeline towards the future along with 
other events, while also facing backwards to reflect on what has just transpired. These 
two directions of motion provide the means to integrate our subjective experience with 
the genuine existence of an objective world of which we are also a part. 
 
 
VI. Comparison with Husserl   
Husserl is good counterpoint for a comparison with Hodgson on the experience of the 
present moment. Contemporary discussions of the experience of time largely draw on 
Husserl, especially for projects like neurophenomenology (e.g. Varela 1999; Thompson, 
Lutz, and Cosmelli 2005; Lutz and Thompson 2003). Hodgson’s work strikingly 
prefigures many key parts of Husserl, both in methodology and in the details about the 
character of temporal experience. Yet they also differ in stark and surprising ways. Most 
notably, Hodgson moves from a phenomenological bracketing of the external world and 
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what causes our experience, to connect our experience to what he calls neuronal 
processes. While there isn’t space for detailed discussion here, Hodgson offers an early 
neurophenomenological account that is surprisingly detailed given that it dates from the 
late 19th century. 
 Readers unfamiliar with Husserl’s phenomenology of inner time consciousness 
can find more in the chapter by Brough, this volume. Briefly, Husserl offers a tripartite 
fixed structure of the present moment, through which contents flow. The forward-
directed edge is called protention, the central part is called primal impression, and the 
trailing edge is called retention. Hodgson’s version is similar with respect to retention, 
but differs markedly in several ways: his notions of threshold and reflection in the 
empirical present do not correspond in any neat way to protention and primal impression; 
and Hodgson rejects a fixed structure of the present through which content flows, 
emphasizing the inseparable character of process-contents. 
 With respect to method, Hodgson’s bracketing of the questions of real conditions 
and genesis may differ in small details from the phenomenological approach of Husserl, 
but only in small details. Husserl brackets the external world, setting those questions 
aside and not returning to them. Yet Hodgson moves past the bracketing and re-
introduces the world outside of experience, even the brain processes that sustain 
experience, in a very non-Husserlian way. This makes his account more amenable to 
direct application in neurophenomenology than Husserl’s. Hodgson’s threshold is 
explicitly tied to neuronal activity, even though the precise nature of that activity is not 
specified. His method of connecting underlying brain activity and events in the external 
world to the ongoing content of experience arguably makes Hodgson the original 
neurophenomenologist. 
 In addition to similarities in methodology, both thinkers offer a very similar 
notion of retention as a way of characterizing just-past contents of experience that are not 
yet in memory. In both cases, the phenomenon of retention is illuminated by contrasting 
it with memory proper, which requires recollection to bring the contents back into current 
experience. That they use such similar terminology to mark this phenomenon is also 
remarkable.  
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 There are a number of such commonalities between their works that may stem 
from genuinely direct influence. The question of whether Husserl was familiar with the 
work of Hodgson was first raised by Spicker (1973). Spicker provides a very detailed 
comparison of several main points of comparison between Husserl and Hodgson, noting 
repeatedly that Hodgson anticipates Husserl in numerous ways. Spicker offers a timeline 
by which to track a multitude of possible pathways from Hodgson to Husserl. Some of 
these are indirect, where Hodgson's influence on Husserl was filtered through the lens of 
William Jame's writings (see also Andersen 2014). Some were more direct, where 
Husserl had access to and clearly read at least of Hodgson's work. Scholars at the Husserl 
archives continue to translate Husserl's dense shorthand into German, such that 
potentially decisive evidence about specific passages of Hodgson's that Husserl drew on, 
or which he read during the critical time period during which he was writing his lecture 
notes developing his own account of time consciousness, may be forthcoming in yet-
untranslated material. 
 Even with these commonalities in their views, both thinkers still diverge on 
central ideas. A major point of difference lies in the present as a structure. Husserl is 
often taken to provide a structure for the present moment in experience, through which 
content continuously flows (e.g. Dainton 2006). Hodgson straightforwardly rejects this 
idea. Once one gets to this fundamental metaphysical level of analysis for experience, 
there are only process-contents, which cannot have their duration or place in the present 
moment separated from their content. The present moment itself has no fixed permanent 
structure, nor a fixed duration, because it lacks a fixed or unified trailing edge in 
retention. 
 There are also clear differences between Hodgson’s notions of threshold and 
reflection, and Husserl’s protention and primal impression. The phenomenon of 
protention cannot find a space in Hodgson. It would require current process-contents to 
shape or influence those about to cross or just crossing the threshold, a possibility for 
which Hodgson does not allow. The threshold is a stark boundary, and the way process-
contents just keep coming over the threshold does not correspond to protention in 
Husserl’s sense.  
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 The Husserlian phenomenon of primal impression is also awkward to translate 
into Hodgson’s view. Husserl has no equivalent to the threshold. The primal impression 
might be best understood as process-contents that are crossing or have only just barely 
crossed the threshold, such that it is not yet in reflective consciousness. But the primal 
impression already has its content in a certain way, but Hodgsonian content just crossing 
the threshold is not yet reflected in experience. One might think that when a process-
content has crossed the threshold of consciousness fully, such that it is now reflected in 
experience, it would be equivalent to the primal impression. But this would misconstrue 
Hodgson’s emphasis on the way in which different process-contents traverse the present 
moment in experience, namely, that they can do so differentially.  
 Husserl’s work has been the almost exclusive focus for neurophenomenologists. 
Part of what is potentially so useful about a Hodgsonian account of neurophenomenology 
is the place his thought occupies in the overall canon of philosophy. Hodgson is, I would 
argue, the last of the classic British Empiricists, and explicitly situates his own work as 
the conclusion of a trajectory of thought that begins in the early modern period. Husserl’s 
work, while worthwhile, is harder to incorporate directly into much of the existing 
philosophical discussion of knowledge, experience, and scientifically informed 
philosophy of mind (see, for instance, Smith 2013 for concerns about 
neurophenomenology from the phenomenological perspective). Husserl struck out on a 
new path with his development of phenomenology, one that was followed up by thinkers 
like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, but which involved fewer direct discussions with the 
philosophical literature growing under the twentieth century tradition of analytic 
philosophy. Accordingly, most authors working to bring together time consciousness and 
brain processes draw only on Husserl’s work, and draw only on the first portions of his 
work, offering the tripartite structure as sufficient for their purposes. Hodgson’s work 
offers an account of the empirical present moment that is recognizably phenomenological 
in many regards, but also begins to draw connections to neuronal processes, and which is 
clearly situated in a philosophical tradition stemming back to the early modern period and 





Hodgson developed a novel philosophical method and account of the fundamentally 
temporal character of experience that differs in significant ways from any other existing 
account of temporal experience (even, arguably, from any other account of experience 
broadly construed). His work is both historically significant, and philosophically useful in 
contemporary discussions. Hodgson’s Metaphysic of Experience comes just at the close 
of a long-standing British tradition of a certain style of empiricist thought. It also stands 
just before the beginning of a new distinctive style of British empiricism that emerged 
with Russell, Whitehead, and others. It is likely that Hodgson’s work is part of the 
tradition being rejected by these new empiricists, who are sometimes characterized by 
contrast with the phenomenological tradition in terms of the analytic-continental divide. 
Hodgson’s work straddles these two traditions before the split by standing at the 
culmination of the earlier trajectory of British empiricism. The Hodgsonian account of 
temporal experience offers a new version of phenomenology that is the completion of a 
familiar form of British Empiricism, explicitly developed in responses to figures such as 
Descartes, Hume, and Kant. While Hodgson had an enormous influence in late 19th 
century English philosophy, his voice is rarely heard today, and is ripe for re-evaluation 
and re-incorporation. His Metaphysic of Experience is a treasure trove of philosophical 
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